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Abstract
The literature on policy dynamics has long argued for a better conceptualization and meas-
urement of the dependent variable (“policy”), but this fundamental point has often been 
neglected in the policy feedback literature. In this paper, we explore how far disaggregating 
policy into different elements (policy instruments, objectives, and settings) addresses this 
gap. We do so by examining the world’s largest market-based climate policy instrument—
emissions trading in the European Union—and reveal a number of valuable new insights. 
First, even if positive policy feedback locks in a policy instrument, actor contestation does 
not disappear, but narrows down to the more detailed level of policy settings. Second, feed-
back may operate differently at each policy level: the policy instrument and its settings 
may strengthen at the same time as support for broader objectives weakens. Finally, posi-
tive feedback may simultaneously strengthen opposing actors’ support for multiple policy 
elements, leading to a form of “policy stability by stalemate.” These findings highlight the 
need for a new, interdisciplinary phase of policy feedback research that more fully disag-
gregates the dependent variable across a wider range of policy areas and policy instrument 
types. Policy scientists are well equipped to contribute to and benefit from such a debate.
Keywords Policy feedback · Dependent variable · European Union · Climate change · 
Emissions trading
Introduction
The policy feedback literature has made important empirical and theoretical advances in 
recent years, building on Schattschneider’s observation that “new policies create a new 
politics” (1935, p. 288). In general terms, this literature has studied how public policies, 
once adopted, influence subsequent policy making through their effects on the resources 
and interpretations of policy actors. Empirically, it originally focused on social policy in 
the USA (Campbell 2003; Pierson 1994; Skocpol 1992), but has since expanded in geo-
graphical scope (e.g., to the European Union; Daugbjerg 2003; Jordan and Matt 2014) and 
has analyzed other policy areas such as climate change (Skjærseth 2018; Jordan and Moore 
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2020), transport (Skogstad 2017), and prisons (Dagan and Teles 2015). In this context, the 
literature has focused on feedback effects on mass publics (e.g., Campbell 2012; Mettler 
and SoRelle 2014), and interest groups (e.g., Jordan and Matt 2014).
In doing so, policy feedback scholars have made a number of important theoretical con-
tributions. First, research has further explicated the precise mechanisms through which 
policy feedback operates, e.g., via resource redistribution or by influencing actor interpre-
tations of a policy (see Béland 2010; Jacobs and Weaver 2015; Pierson 1993). Second, it 
has distinguished between positive feedback (that strengthens a policy) and negative feed-
back (that weakens it) and explored the conditions under which each is more or less likely 
(Jacobs and Weaver 2015; Oberlander and Weaver 2015; Pierson 2004; Weaver 2010). 
More recently, there has been a renewed interest in the role of agency (Koreh et al. 2019; 
Sewerin et al. 2020), related to the role that actors play in the social construction of feed-
back (Dagan and Teles 2015; Oberlander and Weaver 2015, p. 58) and its intentional crea-
tion (Jordan and Matt 2014, p. 233; Jordan and Moore 2020; Haelg et al. 2020).
In this article, we focus on a key gap in the existing literature: the nature of the dependent 
variable, i.e., “policy.” In the past, many scholars have focused on policy feedback mecha-
nisms, i.e., how “policy creates a new politics” (Jacobs and Weaver 2015, pp. 444–450; 
Pierson 1993, p. 626; Skocpol 1992, p. 58). In addition, others have examined policy as 
an independent variable, focusing on how feedback effects are created by specific policy 
design elements, such as the level of pension benefits (Campbell 2011) or the inclusion of 
policy revision provisions (Jordan and Matt 2014, pp. 233–234). However, the existing lit-
erature still leaves relatively unspecified the policy aspects which are actually impacted by 
feedback effects, either treating policy as a single, aggregated whole or neglecting the issue 
entirely. Analyzing policy feedback at a broad level has, as noted above, proven fruitful, 
but struggles to capture instances where feedback has distinct impacts on different policy 
design elements (Hacker 1998; Jacobs and Weaver 2015).
To address this gap, we draw on the policy change literature to develop an approach that 
distinguishes between the impacts of policy feedback on different policy sub-elements—
instruments, objectives, and settings (Cashore and Howlett 2007; Daugbjerg 1997; Hall 
1993; Howlett and Cashore 2009). Our research question is as follows: through what mech-
anisms and with what net effects does a particular policy instrument produce feedbacks at 
the level of policy instruments, objectives, and settings? In doing so, we analyze the case of 
the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), a key climate and energy policy 
in Europe. The EU ETS is the world’s largest greenhouse gas emissions trading system 
(Point Carbon 2018, p. 3) and has a long policy history, dating back to the late 1990s. Dur-
ing that time, it has undergone a near-continuous process of policy change: since 2003, six 
major reforms have been adopted (Jevnaker and Wettestad 2017; Skjærseth and Wettestad 
2010). The ETS is a highly complex instrument that creates uneven benefits and costs for 
a wide range of actors. It is also a prominent example of a market-based instrument in 
the climate policy field, and a key component of EU policy in this area. As a result, it 
offers a promising case in which to assess the usefulness of adopting a more disaggregated 
view of the dependent variable which could potentially be generalized and tested in rela-
tion to other policy instruments. Thus, for us analyzing the ETS is a first step in outlining a 
more disaggregated approach to studying policy feedback and testing its applicability in an 
actual case of policy change (Eckstein 1975).
To inform our test, we utilize process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015, p. 7). Our 
main sources of evidence are primary and secondary documents including official pub-
lications of the European Union institutions, other policy documents, position papers by 
non-governmental actors, news media reports and reports by research institutes and think 
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tanks. In addition, we draw on thirty-two semi-structured elite interviews with European 
Commission officials, Members of the European Parliament and staff, government offi-
cials in the Environment Council, as well as staff in environmental NGOs and business 
associations.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. The next section situates our argument in 
the existing literature on policy feedback, noting the different mechanisms and directions 
through which feedback operates. The subsequent section presents our more differenti-
ated approach to “policy,” distinguishing between the impact of policy feedback on policy 
objectives, instruments, and settings. We then analyze the EU ETS over a 20-year time 
period from 1998 to 2018, thus easily satisfying the widely recognized minimum standard 
in policy research (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, pp. 192–193). Finally, we discuss our main 
findings and, in the concluding section, identify promising new directions for policy feed-
back research.
Policy feedback: an overview
Policy feedback is the process through which a public policy affects actors (e.g., by creat-
ing new resource flows or costs), and in turn influences subsequent policy making in ways 
that may eventually lead to changes in the original policy. In reviewing the existing litera-
ture on this concept, we will focus on three core aspects: feedback mechanisms; the distinc-
tion between positive and negative feedback; and existing approaches to disaggregating the 
dependent variable. For us, policy feedback is self-evidently not the only factor that can 
affect policy change; multiple other factors may also be crucial. We do not attempt to test 
policy feedback as an explanatory factor to the exclusion of these other potential factors (as 
others have attempted to do, e.g., Pierson 1994). Instead, other factors are conceptualized 
as interacting with feedback mechanisms to lead to observed policy outcomes.
Scholars have categorized the mechanisms of policy feedback in a number of ways (e.g., 
Jacobs and Weaver 2015, p. 445; Oberlander and Weaver 2015, pp. 41–42; Skocpol 1992, 
p. 58). Especially influential has been Pierson’s (1993, p. 626) division between resource/
incentive and interpretive mechanisms. Resource/incentive mechanisms operate through 
the effects that a policy has on the resource flows and incentives which confront politi-
cal actors. Examples include policy-induced changes to the level of resources that actors 
have at their disposal (Campbell 2003; Pierson 1993, pp. 598, 626), an actor’s capacity 
to influence future policy-making processes (Mettler 2002, p. 353), or the incentives for 
political action (Pierson 2000). Interpretive mechanisms operate through the effects that a 
policy has on actors’ interpretations, both of the policy itself and the wider issue area. For 
example, the way in which a policy is designed can influence its own visibility to its target 
groups, making it easier or more difficult for actors to understand how it has affected them 
(Pierson 1993, 1994).
It has long been recognized that policy feedback can strengthen a policy through posi-
tive feedback or weaken it through negative feedback (for an early example, see Skocpol 
1992, pp. 58–59). The literature has largely focused on positive policy feedback (e.g., 
Campbell 2003; Pierson 1994, 2000). However, following an influential intervention by 
Weaver (2010), there has been a stronger focus on negative feedback and its role in weak-
ening policies. A number of studies have also looked at the interaction between positive 
and negative feedbacks (e.g., Béland et al. 2018; Jacobs and Weaver 2015; Jordan and Matt 
2014; Meckling 2019; Oberlander and Weaver 2015; Skogstad 2017).
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Ideally, an expanded focus on both positive and negative feedbacks should lead to a 
more in-depth discussion of which policy aspects are being strengthened or weakened by 
policy feedback. But the existing literature has largely chosen to adopt a highly blunt, i.e., 
aggregated, definition of policy, defined variously as an individual policy instrument (e.g., 
Jordan and Matt 2014), a policy mix (Skjærseth 2018), a piece of legislation (Béland et al. 
2018), or a policy regime (Weaver 2010). However, some scholars have begun to explore 
how policy feedback can have distinct effects on the constituent elements of an overall pol-
icy. This approach was apparent in Oberlander and Weaver’s (2015, p. 47) account of the 
U.S. Affordable Care Act, in which they discussed how the legislation’s “broad array of 
policies” were affected by feedback. More recently, Béland et al. (2018, p. 2) have argued 
for “breaking down the [Act] into some of its different policy components” (see also 
Béland et al. 2020).
We believe these efforts have the potential to shed new light on policy dynamics in gen-
eral and policy feedback in particular for two reasons. First, the sheer size and complexity 
of some public policies makes it more likely that they will create multiple feedbacks, both 
positive and negative, and that these will affect different elements of the same policy in 
distinct ways. This pattern can certainly be seen with respect to the Affordable Care Act, 
where positive feedback related to popular provisions, such as the regulations requiring 
health insurance companies to cover pre-existing medical conditions, stood in contrast to 
negative feedback related to unpopular provisions that imposed costs on the public, such as 
the financial penalty for failing to purchase health insurance (Béland et al. 2018, pp. 21–23; 
Oberlander and Weaver 2015, p. 58).
Second, policy feedback may have different impacts on a policy instrument and its abil-
ity to fulfill its objectives. Scholars have long included both of these elements in their defi-
nitions of policy feedback in a way that implies that feedback that strengthens an instru-
ment will also support the fulfillment of its objectives. In her influential contribution, 
Skocpol (1992, p. 60) states that positive policy feedback occurs if a policy “stimulates 
groups and political alliances to defend the policy’s continuation and expansion,” while 
negative feedback stimulates “groups that seek to repeal or reorient the policy in question” 
(emphasis added). But in the same section (p. 59), she adds that feedback can also serve to 
“promote […] the further extension of [a] line of policymaking” or “frustrate the further 
extension of that line of policymaking” (p. 59, emphasis added). Hers is thus a wider defi-
nition of feedback, potentially encompassing both the policy itself and its long-term objec-
tives. Similar definitions can be found in more recent work. Jacobs and Weaver (2015, p. 
444) state that positive feedback serves to “reinforce the underlying social foundations of 
[a policy’s] own political support,” in contrast to negative feedback that serves to “dimin-
ish those policies’ bases of political support.”1 But they also argue that feedback can either 
“strengthen the direction and orientation of status quo policy” or “result in changes that 
run against the grain of current policy” (emphasis added).
And indeed in some cases, when positive feedback strengthens a policy instrument it 
also makes successful policy outcomes more likely, and vice versa. For example, posi-
tive feedback that strengthened the position of public pensions in the U.S. also helped to 
advance the ultimate objective of supporting the elderly (Campbell 2003). But the policy 
feedback literature has also noted cases where a policy instrument’s political success is 
detrimental to its ultimate objectives. For example, policies designed to support the use of 
1 Jacobs and Weaver refer to positive feedback as “self-reinforcing feedback” and negative feedback as 
“self-undermining feedback.”
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corn-based ethanol as a transport fuel have built strong supportive constituencies among 
farmers and have proven politically resilient, despite their dubious environmental creden-
tials (Biber et al. 2017, p. 670; see also Skogstad 2017).
On the other hand, negative policy feedback can also contribute to the removal of an 
ineffective policy instrument and its replacement by an alternative. In the EU, this was the 
pattern of change in the area of car emissions (Jordan and Matt 2014). The initial emis-
sion reduction policy, a voluntary agreement to reduce carbon dioxide emissions brokered 
between the European Commission (the EU’s executive body) and the automobile industry, 
was so weak that it was widely perceived to have failed, empowering the coalition that 
had long advocated for regulatory instruments (Jordan and Moore 2020). We believe that a 
more disaggregated approach to policy feedback can better capture these complex dynam-
ics which are a potentially important aspect of policy change, and turn to that topic in the 
next section.
Disaggregating policy into its constituent elements
Our approach to disaggregating policy draws on and makes fresh connections between the 
literatures on policy change, policy dynamics, and social learning. A useful starting point 
is Hall’s (1993) landmark study of economic policy, in which he identified three policy 
“variables” or elements: “the overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field, the 
techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals, and the precise settings of these 
instruments” (Hall 1993, pp. 278–279, emphasis added). He defined goals as the broad 
outcome sought by a policy, instruments as the specific tools used to attain those goals, 
and instrument settings as the more operational decisions about, e.g., the level of funding 
associated with a subsidy. A number of scholars have used Hall’s framework as the basis 
for modified approaches to understanding policy change. For example, Daugbjerg (1997, 
pp. 126–127) added the concept of policy principles (e.g., market principles versus the 
principle of state intervention in agricultural policy).
More recent theoretical work has sought to further expand on Hall’s original approach. 
For example, Cashore and Howlett (2007) distinguished the difference between policy ends 
and policy means, as well as between levels of abstraction: specific on-the-ground meas-
ures, program-level operationalization, and high level abstraction (Howlett and Cashore 
2009). This leads to six policy elements. At the highest level of abstraction are broad goals 
(e.g., environmental protection) and instrument logics that guide which types of policies 
are used. Program-level operationalization includes formal policy objectives as well as pol-
icy instruments. Finally, on-the-ground measures include policy settings and their calibra-
tions/levels. This taxonomy of policy components has been used in a number of studies of 
comparative policy analysis (e.g., Burns et al. 2018; Dupuis and Biesbroek 2013; Schaffrin 
et al. 2015). The terminology employed by Hall, Daugbjerg, and Cashore/Howlett at times 
overlaps, but their definitions are not always aligned. For example, Daugbjerg’s concept of 
policy principles shares aspects with Howlett and Cashore’s concept of instrumental logic, 
whereas Hall’s notion of settings seem to be closer in meaning to Howlett and Cashore’s 
calibrations (see Howlett and Cashore 2009, p. 36).
For simplicity’s sake, our approach focuses on three main elements: policy instru-
ments, objectives, and settings. It relies mainly on Hall’s approach but shares some simi-
larities with the taxonomies of Daugbjerg and Cashore/Howlett. First, sitting at the center 
of the analysis is the policy instrument being analyzed. Policy instruments—the tools of 
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government—can be classified in several ways. One approach is to compare instruments 
according to their level of coerciveness, from low-coerciveness voluntary instruments to 
mandatory, high-coerciveness regulatory instruments (Phidd and Doern 1992). Another 
important distinction is between substantive instruments, which are aimed at addressing 
the specific policy issue at hand, and procedural instruments focused on coordinating pol-
icy formulation, decision-making, and implementation (see Capano and Howlett 2020). In 
general, positive policy feedback increases the likelihood that the status quo instrument 
will remain stable, whereas negative feedback lowers it. Within the policy instrument cat-
egory, we also distinguish between specific policy instrument components, i.e., individual 
design elements within an instrument, such as the cap in a cap-and-trade system (Béland 
et al. 2018).
Second, policy objectives can either be codified in legislation or be part of the tacit 
knowledge that unites policy actors into coalitions. Objectives and their relative impor-
tance can be contested by different actors, especially in cases where a policy instrument 
aims to reach multiple objectives at the same time, perhaps involving difficult tradeoffs (see 
Ackrill and Kay 2014). Positive policy feedback affecting policy objectives creates a higher 
likelihood of achieving or exceeding those objectives, while negative feedback creates a 
lower likelihood of this happening.
Third, policy settings include the level of funding provided for by a subsidy instrument, 
the strictness of emission limits in an environmental pollution regulation, or the generosity 
of the benefit provided by a public pension instrument. Positive policy feedback affecting a 
policy setting creates a higher likelihood of more stringent or stable policy settings. Nega-
tive feedback creates a higher likelihood of less stringent settings. In reality (and depending 
on its complexity), a policy instrument is likely to have a large number of settings which 
can generate political contestation during the formulation process. As a result, policy feed-
back that strengthens one policy setting may simultaneously weaken others, especially if 
two settings are mutually exclusive or involve a tradeoff. Table 1 sets out each of the policy 
elements introduced above and their relationship to positive and negative policy feedback 
(see also Haelg et al., this issue; Daugbjerg and Kay, this issue).
The EU Emissions Trading System
Core design features
The EU ETS is an example of a cap-and-trade system, which sets a limit on the amount of 
greenhouse gases that can be emitted in covered sectors, then allocates tradable “emission 
allowances” to these sectors (Tietenberg 2006). The industries concerned are required to 
surrender allowances equal to their emissions. Allowances are either distributed for free to 
specific recipients (free allocation) or auctioned to the highest bidder. The ability to trade 
allowances provides organizations (normally companies) with the option to either reduce 
emissions or buy allowances. The ETS has had four phases: Phase I (2005–2007), Phase II 
(2008–2012), Phase III (2013–2020) and Phase IV (2021–2030).
Under the EU’s Ordinary Legislative Procedure, the European Commission coordinates 
ETS-related policy formulation and publishes initial legislative proposals. Proposals are 
then adopted jointly by the directly elected European Parliament and the Environment 
Council, where environment ministers from the national governments of the EU member 
states meet. The European Council, consisting of the Heads of State and Government of 
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the member states, sets the EU’s overall policy direction. The key industries covered by 
the ETS (the target groups) are the electricity generation industry and the so-called energy-
intensive industries (including steel, cement, refineries, glass, and paper production).2 Out-
side of these industries, a large number of market intermediaries (such as financial insti-
tutions, banks, and energy traders), as well as environmental NGOs (ENGOs), are also 
strongly engaged in ETS-related policy making and thus have the potential to be affected 
by policy feedback.
Policy adoption (1998–2003)
EU emissions trading was first proposed after the EU failed to adopt a carbon/energy tax 
in the early 1990s (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008, pp. 1–6). Before the ETS was adopted 
in 2003, support was mixed for emissions trading. The European Commission’s 2001 leg-
islative proposal called for a mandatory, EU-wide cap-and-trade system (European Com-
mission 2001a). A number of EU member states supported emissions trading in principle. 
However, even some supporters such as the UK pushed for a voluntary system (European 
Commission 2001b, pp. 8–9). In the Council, the German government was skeptical and 
considered blocking the proposal (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008, pp. 108–110). The Euro-
pean Parliament was generally supportive of the approach (European Commission 2001b, 
p. 2).3
Environmental NGOs, coordinated by Climate Action Network Europe (CAN Europe), 
emphasized that the ETS was only a small part of the solution and needed to be designed 
rigorously (European Commission 2001b, p. 5). While many electricity companies and oil 
companies supported emissions trading (Eurelectric 2001;  Meckling 2011), most of the 
energy-intensive industries, as well as German electricity generators, preferred voluntary, 
non-binding agreements between national governments and industry (European Commis-
sion 2001b, p. 1).4 However, the energy-intensive industries were disengaged early in the 
process and did not effectively coordinate their positions (Wettestad 2009).5 Regardless of 
the mixed support for the proposal, the ETS Directive was eventually adopted unanimously 
by the Council and the Parliament and began operation in January 2005.
Policy Centralization (2003–2009)
Once it was in place, the ETS became a ‘fact on the ground’ (Müller and Slominski 
2013, p. 1435). EU member states, the European Parliament, and the Commission had all 
invested significant political capital in adopting the measure, and it had become a major 
part of the EU’s response to its commitments under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Positive 
resource/incentive feedback mechanisms helped push the electricity generation industry 
to unite in support of the instrument, in part because they were able to pass on a high 
proportion of their allowance costs to energy consumers (including the energy-intensive 
3 Interviewee, European Parliament. May 13, 2016.
4 Interviewee, Electricity Industry. April 11, 2017.
5 Interviewee, European Commission. May 20, 2016.
2 Since 2012, the ETS has also covered aviation activities within the EU. However, the aviation industry, 
and the policy making surrounding its inclusion, is treated differently than other ETS industries. Due to 
space constraints, it is excluded from this analysis.
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industries) and many were able to secure additional, “windfall” profits in this way (Sijm 
et al. 2006). Other resource/incentive mechanisms strongly affected carbon market traders 
and consultants, who became much more supportive and engaged in policy making as the 
value of the allowance market increased.6 Influenced by positive interpretive mechanisms, 
CAN Europe became more supportive as the ETS grew in importance and shifted closer to 
their design preferences of a centralized system (Moore 2018, p. 146; Skjærseth and Wet-
testad 2010, pp. 111–112).
The broadening of support for the instrument did not, however, mean that political 
opposition entirely disappeared. Initially, the energy-intensive industries continued to 
push for alternative market-based approaches to the cap-and-trade instrument (Alliance of 
Energy Intensive Industries et  al. 2007). But they also received new financial resources 
through free allocation of allowances (which they benefited from disproportionately) and 
gradually moved to advocating change within the logic of the cap-and-trade system. They 
also realized that they had shared interests in continued free allocation and formally cre-
ated the Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries (AEII) in 2005 to lobby on ETS-related 
issues (AEII 2005).
While the ETS as a policy instrument now seemed more secure, it underwent major 
changes after 2013. The instrument adopted in 2003 was highly decentralized: each of 
the 27 member states allocated emission allowances to companies (under Commission 
oversight) and determined how many were auctioned (up to an 8% maximum over the 
2005–2012 period). The overall ETS cap was determined ‘bottom-up’ by combining these 
national allocations. In the first two trading phases, member states gave 97% of allowances 
to industry for free (the free-allocation share) and auctioned only 3% (the auction share). 
Free allocation transferred the value of allowances to ETS industries, while auctioning 
transferred it, as revenue, to member state governments. As a result, free allocation in the 
first two trading phases led to a significant transfer of resources to industry (de Bruyn et al. 
2016).
The decentralized design of the ETS allowed industries to move from one member state 
to another to negotiate, insisting on higher allocations for themselves and claiming that 
their future investment decisions would be contingent on these decisions (Moore 2018, pp. 
139–140; Wettestad 2009).7 This created important negative interpretive feedback mecha-
nisms among the member states, who became highly frustrated with the national allocation 
process.8 Another effect of overallocation was that in the first trading phase (2005–2007) 
the ETS had more allowances available than emissions. This undermined the policy objec-
tive of reducing overall emissions from ETS sectors and led to a steep fall in allowance 
prices from €30 to near zero by 2007. Partly in response, in its oversight role the Commis-
sion cut a number of national allocations in the second trading phase (2008–2012).
While the decentralized ETS was favorable to many affected industries, it nonetheless 
led to growing support for a new approach among the member states, who had initially 
blocked the centralized system that the Commission’s Directorate-General for Environment 
(DG Environment) and the European Parliament had long preferred. The 2009 Directive—
which reformed the ETS for its third trading period between 2013 and 2020—therefore 
6 Interviewee, Market Intermediary. June 21, 2016.
7 Interviewee, Member State Government. June 7, 2016; Interviewee, European Commission. July 30, 
2016.
8 Interviewee, European Commission. May 20, 2016; Interviewee, Member State Government. June 7, 
2016.
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created an EU-wide cap set in accordance with the EU’s commitment to a 20% greenhouse 
gas emission reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. Starting in 2013, a linear reduc-
tion factor (LRF) automatically reduced the cap by 1.74% per year to reach a 21% reduc-
tion in ETS sectors by 2020 compared to 2005 emission levels.
The 2009 Directive centralized allowance allocation and created a major shift toward 
auctioning. Drawing on evidence that auctioning was both more effective and could address 
the problems with allocation from the first two phases (DG Environment and Ecofys 2006), 
the 2009 Directive increased auctioning from 3 to 57% of allocation and reduced free allo-
cation from 97% to 43%. Energy-intensive industries continued to receive free allocation at 
a reduced level, and most electricity generators were required to buy allowances at auction. 
However, the Central and Eastern European member states such as Poland successfully 
secured the option to allocate 40% of their auctioning allowances to their electricity gener-
ators for free (ENDS Report 2008). Crucially, two key policy instrument components—the 
free-allocation share and the auction share—were centralized to the EU level, giving the 
EU institutions more responsibility.
Intervening in the market (2009–2018)
Just as the 2009 Directive was being finalized, the ETS faced new problems caused by 
external factors, especially the European economic crisis that began in 2008. Sharply fall-
ing emissions and panic selling from ETS industries led to a new oversupply of allow-
ances—which was referred to as the “allowance surplus” (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009, p. 
6; European Commission 2012). This surplus increased to 2.1 billion allowances by 2012, 
causing prices to fall from a high of near €30 in 2008 to below €5 in 2012 (Sandbag 2019). 
The EU sought to address this issue with “volume management” to reduce the allowance 
surplus and, it was hoped, raise prices. These efforts were highly contentious, but crucially 
they focused on the settings and design of the ETS, not the fate of the policy instrument 
itself. The coalition in support of volume management was brought together by various 
feedback mechanisms. The Commission supported raising the price because the perceived 
efficacy of the ETS had become closely tied to the price level. Environmental NGOs sup-
ported higher prices as a way to drive decarbonization. A number of other actors had ben-
efited from the resource/incentive mechanisms created by the ETS, mechanisms that grew 
stronger when prices were high. These actors included low-carbon electricity generators 
that benefited when the carbon price indirectly raised electricity prices, market interme-
diaries, and many of the  EU member states which derived more revenue from auction-
ing (European Commission 2017). In contrast, energy-intensive industries and high-carbon 
electricity generators, already under pressure from the imminent reduction of free allo-
cation in the 2009 Directive, argued that low prices were an appropriate response by the 
market-based ETS to the economic crisis and that the “carbon price […] reflects the eco-
nomic downturn exactly as it should” (AEII 2012a, p. 1). Therefore, although contestation 
had moved down to the detailed level of settings, policy debates were still closely tied to 
fundamental disagreements about the objectives of the ETS. Actors that supported volume 
management emphasized the ETS’s role in triggering technological innovation by driving 
decarbonization (thus requiring higher prices), whereas the actors that opposed it empha-
sized the importance of aiming for cost-efficient emission reductions (and lower prices).
One approach to volume management was to increase the linear reduction factor (LRF) 
that progressively tightened the ETS cap, which also would have contributed to the policy’s 
emission reduction objective (European Commission 2012). This option was supported by 
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actors including most electricity generators, some member states including the UK, and 
environmental NGOs (European Commission 2013, p. 5). The energy-intensive industries 
were opposed because increasing the LRF would raise prices and reduce the amount of 
allowances available for free allocation. The Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries and a 
number of Central and Eastern European electricity generators also opposed the European 
Council setting a unilateral greenhouse gas target in the international negotiations leading 
up to the Paris Agreement in 2015 because it would also affect the LRF, thereby directly 
opposing stronger EU-wide targets even outside the ETS (AEII 2012b; Polish Electricity 
Association 2013, p. 2). In the end, the central approach taken to volume management was 
a delay to the auctioning of 900 million allowances (backloading, adopted in 2013) and 
the creation of a Market Stability Reserve (MSR, adopted in 2015). The MSR would with-
drawal the equivalent of 12% of the allowances in circulation if the surplus rose above 
a pre-defined threshold (see Wettestad and Jevnaker 2016). Crucially, these withdrawn 
allowances would be taken from the auction share, in part to avoid the politically fraught 
process of removing them from the free allocation to individual companies.9
These debates on volume management and allocation continued during the preparation 
of the 2018 Directive, the legislation that set the parameters for the ETS’s fourth trading 
period between 2021 and 2030 (see Wettestad and Jevnaker 2019). In 2014, the European 
Council had decided to set a 40% reduction target for 2030 (European Council 2014), and 
the 2018 Directive was meant to implement that new target for the ETS. In these discus-
sions, a coalition including France, Sweden, and the UK pushed for more changes to raise 
allowance prices further, including a temporarily increased 24% intake rate into the MSR 
and cancelation of MSR allowances. These proposals were supported by the actors that 
would benefit from high carbon prices, including low-carbon electricity generators and 
market intermediaries. Although not explicitly designed for this purpose, allowance cancel-
lation would also indirectly increase the stringency of the ETS cap and therefore increase 
greenhouse gas reductions. During this time, the Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries 
opposed an increased MSR intake as well as cancelation, but they largely focused their 
time and energy on increasing the free-allocation share at the expense of the auction share 
(Moore 2018, p. 210). Energy-intensives generally called for there to be no limit on free 
allocation under the ETS’s cap, implying that in principle the ETS could become 100% free 
allocation (see European Commission 2015, p. 113). On the other side, some actors such 
as the UK called for a complete phase-out of free allocation, meaning the ETS would only 
have an auction share afterward. There were therefore coalitions working to both increase 
the free-allocation share and the auction share. However, if one increased, another would 
need to decrease. In the end, the 24% rate for the MSR and cancelation starting in 2024 
were agreed, along with an increase in the free-allocation share to 45% between 2013 and 
2030, contingent on the extra allowances being needed by the energy-intensive industries.
Disaggregating the dependent variable: a discussion
In this article, we have developed and applied a new approach to disaggregating the 
dependent variable in policy feedback research. Drawing on Hall’s (1993) seminal 
framework, we have differentiated between the impact of policy feedback on a policy 
9 Interviewee, European Commission. July 30, 2016.
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instrument, its objectives, and its detailed settings. Our analysis has revealed a number 
of important findings that would have remained hidden if we had retained an aggregated 
focus. In relation to the policy instrument as a whole, the policy feedback created by the 
ETS was strongly positive. An instrument that encountered significant opposition when 
it was first proposed had, within a few years, secured the political support of nearly all 
key policy actors, including many of those that had initially been opposed. In doing so, 
emissions trading became entrenched as the EU’s core instrument to achieve greenhouse 
gas emission control from electricity generation and the energy-intensive industries. 
However, there was a major change in the policy’s components between 2003 and 2009, 
with the expansion of allowance auctioning and the shift from national caps to an EU 
cap. This was driven in large part by dynamics triggered by the initial, more decentral-
ized design of the ETS. Industries were able to lobby their member state governments 
for higher allocations, leading to widespread frustration among EU-level policy makers. 
At the same time, many other policy components, such as the free-allocation share and 
the auction share, helped to nurture constituencies that supported their continuation and 
expansion (Voß and Simons 2014; Simons and Voß 2018). The benefits of free alloca-
tion for energy-intensive industries led them to strongly support the maintenance and 
expansion of the free-allocation share. The same was true of the support that the auction 
share received from low-carbon electricity generators and several member states. Cru-
cially, once adopted, the key components of the revised ETS—namely the EU-level cap 
and the linear reduction factor—were not seriously challenged.
The entrenchment of the ETS and its major policy components after 2009 led to a 
narrowing down in the scope of political contestation to focus largely on the policy’s 
detailed settings. The dividing line between auctioning and free allocation, a seemingly 
technical design issue that arose at the beginning of the ETS, became politically more 
and more consequential, with fierce debates breaking out between opposing coalitions. 
The same was true of the linear reduction factor—another highly specific design feature 
that provided an automatic means of adjusting the system’s settings. When new com-
ponents were added to the ETS—most importantly the Market Stability Reserve—they 
too became foci of political contestation. Policy, in other words, seemed to restructure 
politics in the manner predicted by policy feedback theory.
Meanwhile, a new tension was also created between policy feedbacks related to set-
tings and those related to objectives. Free allocation in the first two phases (2005–2012) 
was a key concession made by the European Commission to guarantee the instrument’s 
adoption. But reducing emissions more quickly also withdrew resources from politically 
influential groups—namely the energy-intensive industries and the Central and Eastern 
European electricity generators—who quickly responded. In turn, they opposed further 
increases in the ambition level of the EU’s broader greenhouse gas reduction objec-
tives because they would lead to a tighter ETS cap. In contrast, dissatisfaction with low 
allowance prices undermined actors’ support for status quo policy settings, such as the 
linear reduction factor, but reinforced support for moving closer to policy objectives and 
rarely led actors to question the policy instrument itself. For example, negative feedback 
related to the new settings introduced by the 2009 Directive was a pre-condition for the 
increased emission reductions caused by the combination of backloading, the MSR, and 
the 2018 Directive.
To summarize, disaggregating policy into its component parts sheds light on the mul-
tiple ways in which policy feeds into politics and then back into policy. In fact, the ETS 
created multiple feedbacks which, in turn, affected many different elements of the origi-
nal policy at the same time. The multiple directions of feedback would not have been 
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apparent if we had only investigated positive feedbacks. The feedbacks related to differ-
ent policy elements would not have been visible if we had treated the ETS as a single 
aggregated policy.
Our case has also revealed three novel findings of a more general nature. First, 
Béland et al. (2018, p. 22) have argued that in the context of the US Affordable Care 
Act, “because major reforms are interdependent webs of regulatory and fiscal authority, 
unpopular provisions may not be easily replaced without undercutting popular reforms.” 
In other words, policy components that are subject to negative feedbacks may be dif-
ficult to dismantle because they are inextricably intertwined with other, more popular 
provisions that are supported by positive feedbacks. Our case raises a rather different 
possibility: critical policy components, namely the linear reduction factor, the auction 
share, and the free-allocation share, each generated constituencies which actively sup-
ported their expansion. However, increasing the reduction factor decreased the total 
size of the allocation available for auctioning and free allocation. Similarly, increasing 
the auction share required reductions in the free-allocation share (and vice versa). As a 
result, support for strengthening one of these components necessitated weakening the 
other two, leading to a situation of relative “policy stability by stalemate” after 2009, 
wherein a change in any of the three components elicited strong political opposition.
Secondly, the initial complexity of the ETS, itself the result of an uneasy compro-
mise between policy actors with widely diverging preferences, created multiple, over-
lapping positive and negative policy feedbacks. For example, when allowance prices fell 
after 2008, it was difficult to increase the linear reduction factor to raise prices because 
of resistance from actors that feared they would be harmed, such as Central and East-
ern European electricity generators. As a result, policy makers were forced to resort to 
an even more complex form of volume management, first delaying auctioning through 
backloading, then creating the Market Stability Reserve, and finally modifying the MSR 
to create a system for canceling allowances. At each step in this protracted process, new 
instrument interventions led to new policy feedbacks which interacted with the already 
existing ETS. Therefore, a key pattern we have revealed is that instrument complexity 
begets fresh complexity, in terms of both the policy’s design and its evolving feedback 
dynamics.
Finally, our case highlights the importance of agency in the operation of policy feed-
back. With finite resources to commit to lobbying, actors faced difficult choices over 
how to respond to multiple, sometimes contradictory policy feedbacks. For example, 
during the negotiation of the 2018 Directive, the Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries 
pushed for an increase in the free-allocation share while also opposing further volume-
management provisions such as canceling allowances. The Alliance eventually chose to 
focus on free allocation—a choice that made it more likely that the volume-management 
provisions would be successfully adopted. Our broader point, however, is that while 
policy feedback may make certain pathways more or less likely, the final outcome often 
depends on how feedback is interpreted and used as a resource by policy actors (Dagan 
and Teles 2015).
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Conclusion and new research directions
We have demonstrated that a more disaggregated approach to the dependent variable pro-
vides a richer understanding of policy feedback. Our findings highlight the need for a new 
phase of policy feedback research that more fully disaggregates the dependent variable 
across a wider range of policy and instrument types (e.g., analyzing both substantive and 
procedural instruments), as well as in increasingly complex policy mixes. Such analyses 
would allow scholars to explore when it is more appropriate to focus on policy as a single 
dependent variable (e.g., when policies are less complex or where a policy and its objec-
tives are expected to be aligned) and when it may be advisable to adopt a more disaggre-
gated approach (e.g., when analyzing internally complex policies in which policy instru-
ments and objectives are more likely to be in tension). Future research could also explore 
other approaches to disaggregating the dependent variable. For example, the taxonomy 
developed by Cashore and Howlett (2007) could be employed to analyze the role of policy 
feedback in the development of abstract policy goals (such as environmental protection ver-
sus economic development) or the instrument logics that guide policy actors’ preferences 
for one type of instrument over another (Cashore and Howlett 2007, p. 536). Disaggregated 
analyses will admittedly require more resources and time on the part of researchers. This 
should be balanced against the analytical benefits of such an approach (Béland et al., this 
issue; Haelg et al., this issue; Daugbjerg and Kay, this issue).
To conclude, the proliferation of new work on the mechanisms, directions, and effects 
of policy feedback is welcome (for reviews, see Béland 2010; Béland and Schlager 2019; 
Campbell 2012; Jordan and Matt 2014; Mettler and SoRelle 2014). A more active consid-
eration of the dependent variable in this research should, we think, be a priority. While 
“there is simply no such thing as the ultimate solution” to the configuration and measure-
ment of policy (Green-Pedersen 2004, p. 12), our analysis nonetheless suggests that a dis-
aggregated approach will allow policy scientists to engage in a broader, more interdiscipli-
nary debate on the role of policy feedback.
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